This paper empirically explores imports' adjustment to reductions in trade policy uncertainty (TPU) considering that firms may face large sunk costs to purchase foreign goods. We investigate how product-level Chinese imports react to tariff binding connected to China's accession to WTO, through distinguishing both country-related margins and firm-related margins. Our main results suggest that a decline in TPU allows the access to a greater variety of foreign goods, associated also with a higher quality. At the same time, tariff binding leads more Chinese producers and trade intermediaries to start importing, allowing more firms and consumers to enjoy potential gains from imports. Finally, we document heterogeneous TPU effects across firms with different ownership, and products with different end use, revealing interesting insights in a context of global value chains.
Introduction
It has been well established in international trade literature that firms need to pay large sunk costs to start exporting (Roberts and Tybout, 1997) . Thus, uncertainty over future trade policies may postpone a firm's decision to enter foreign markets. One of the main principles underlying the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the predictability of national trade policies, which would imply a reduction in uncertainty, providing a better environment to make irreversible investments.
An instrument to pursue trade policy predictability is binding tariff rates on goods, through which WTO members make enforceable commitments to do not increase applied tariffs above certain ceilings (bindings). Following the Uruguay Round in 1995, developed countries exhibited a higher share of product lines with bound tariffs than developing countries (99% versus 73%). Moreover, it is worth noting that despite tariff binding, a relevant uncertainty can still persist if the gap between bound and applied tariff (binding overhang) is relatively high. This discrepancy is quite common amongst developing countries, whereas in developed countries, applied rate and bound rate tend to be the same.
Recent studies have already highlighted that trade policy uncertainty (TPU) may affect negatively firm's export behaviour. Handley (2014) studies theoretically and empirically how TPU defers firm's entry in the export market (delay) and makes firms less sensitive to applied tariff cuts (caution). In particular, using product level data from Australia during 1991-2001 period, he estimates that foreign varieties' entry increases by 4% if applied tariffs are reduced to zero, and by 17% if tariffs are also bound by WTO commitments. Similar findings are also confirmed in a context of preferential trade agreements. Using firm-level data on Portuguese exports, Handley and Limão (2015) document that uncertainty reduction arising from Portugal's accession to the European Community (EC) in 1986 implied a significant increase in Portuguese exporting firms' entry to EC markets. This paper aims at empirically exploring how trade policy uncertainty may influence firm's import behaviourrather than export behaviourgiven that previous works documented that firms also have to face large sunk costs to start importing. Therefore, we expect that the discussions above on TPU and firms' export decisions are even more pertinent for firms' import decisions, since they can imply irreversible changes in production technology, through incorporating foreign intermediate inputs.
Using Chinese (ordinary) trade transaction data during the period 2000-2006, we explore how tariff binding, arising from China's accession to WTO in December 2001, affects imports at the product level. We first make a country-related analysis, differentiating the product-level import value between the number of country-varieties (country-extensive margin) and the average imports per country-variety (country-intensive margin), focusing especially on the former margin, to check whether a reduction in Chinese TPU positively affects the entry of new foreign varieties in China.
In line with Handley (2014) 's findings, our results suggest that following tariff binding, Chinese economy is able to access a greater range of foreign varieties, especially from developed countries, which are typically associated with high-quality. However, we find different results across product groups discerned according to their end use, suggesting that while worldwide firms' decisions to supply final and intermediate goods to China tend to be delayed by China's TPU; their decisions to supply capital goods actually are brought forward. Moreover, while consumers benefit from a greater variety of all foreign final varieties; firms would enjoy the access to both greater variety and higher quality of intermediate varieties.
Next, we carry out a firm-related analysis, differentiating the product-level import value between the number of importing firms (firm-extensive margin) and the average imports per firm (firmintensive margin), focusing more on the former margin to see whether a reduction in Chinese TPU positively affects the entry of new Chinese firms in the import market. We document that tariff binding leads more firms to start importing a given product. This effect is confirmed for both production firms and trade intermediaries, and suggests that more Chinese manufacturing firms are able to import directly or indirectly foreign intermediate inputs, and therefore enjoy potential productivity gains from TPU reduction. In other words, it seems that TPU tends to delay firm's decision to import intermediate inputs. At the same time, we also find that TPU would hasten firm's decision to import capital goods. Finally, it appears that tariff binding pushes more foreign-owned manufacturing firms located in China to import intermediate inputs under ordinary trade regimethrough which they are not obliged to re-exporting as in the case of processing trade regimeand more foreign-owned intermediaries to be involved in importing final varieties. These results suggest that FDI in China start becoming relatively more market-seeking than resource-seeking following Chinese TPU reduction: i.e. foreign multinationals tend to relocate relatively more the downstream stages of global value chains, rather than the upstream stages in China.
in China, carried out respectively by Handley and Limão (2017) and Feng, et al., (2017). Handley and Limão (2017) show theoretically that TPU reduction can lead more firms start exporting and more incumbent exporters upgrade their technology, implying an increase in both number of exporters and the average exports per firm. Then, using 6-digit product level data on Chinese exports to US, they show that uncertainty reduction arising from China's accession to WTO in 2001 implied a significant growth in Chinese exports to US market in the period 2000 -2005 . Feng, Li, and Swenson (2017 also study theoretically and empirically how Chinese exports to US are affected by reducing trade policy uncertainty following China's accession to WTO. More specifically, by using Chinese firm-product level data, they show that TPU reduction lead the entry of new firms in the export market, and the exit of some incumbent exporters. They also demonstrated that export-starters were associated with lower prices and higher quality than exportstoppers. 2 Unlike both studies, we focus on Chinese firm's import reaction to domestic TPU reduction in a context of multilateral trade rather than on Chinese export reactions to foreign TPU reduction in a context of bilateral trade (US-China), by exploiting the time-varying binding status of product lines rather than the binding overhang. It is worth noting that while our country-related results approximately confirm their findings, i.e. that a foreign country's TPU reduction leads more domestic varieties to enter the international market, which are mostly associated with higher quality, our firm-related analysis provides new interesting insights from import perspective in a context of global value chains. 3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used, giving information also about the context. Section 3 sets up the empirical strategy to explore the product level linkage between imports and trade policy uncertainty. Section 4 discusses the results, and Section 5 provides conclusion remarks.
2 Mau (2017) shows that a reduction in US tariff uncertainty following China's WTO accession also positively affected China's exports to the European Union. 3 Pierce and Schott (2016) already provide some evidence, amongst other results, that a reduction in domestic TPU can determine an increase in the number of importing firms at home, in addition to an increase in the number of exporting firms abroad. However, their work mainly focuses on the employment effects of a one-time change in domestic TPU in a developed country within a context of a bilateral trade relationship. In particular, they document that following a reduction in US's TPU respect to Chinese imports, arising from China's accession to WTO, led to relevant employment losses in US, in addition to higher imports from China. The CCTS database contains all China's monthly trade transactions, but we focus only on imports.
Data
For each firm-product-country level import flow, the database provides information on total value, FOB unit value (in US dollars), quantity, and trade regime. It is also possible to distinguish firms according to their macro-sector statusi.e. between producers and trade intermediariesand ownershipi.e. between foreign-owned (FORs) and domestic-owned firms, which are further split in state-owned (SOEs) and private-owned companies (DPRIVs). Since the main purpose of the paper is to investigate how tariff binding affects imports at the product-level, we dropped all observations concerning a specific trade regime different from the ordinary trade regime and collapsed the data at the 6-digit HS product-year level. Subsequently, the import data were merged with product-level data on applied tariffs, bound tariffs, and NTBs, and all observations where applied tariff was missing were dropped. Finally, we restricted our sample to the balanced panel of product lines. Table 1 shows that a product on average exhibited an import value around 17.3 USD million in 2000, and was imported from 13 countries (country-extensive margin) with an average import value per country around 1.1 USD million (country-intensive margin), and by 104 Chinese firms (firm-extensive margin), with an average import value per firm around 0.34 USD million (firmintensive margin). It is worth noting that the two-thirds of source countries were from OECD area.
Product-level Imports
Moreover, about two-thirds of importing firms were producers, mostly foreign-owned and state-owned firms, whereas the remaining share were trade intermediaries, almost exclusively stateowned firms.
During the period 2000-2006, the product-level import value drastically increased (by about 38.6 USD million), due to both country-related intensive and extensive margins. More specifically, a product was on average imported from additional three developed countries and three developing countries, which suggests an increase in variety of both high-quality goods and low-quality goods. 4 Import growth was also due to an increase in both firm-related intensive and extensive margins. In particular, the increase in the number of importing firms concerned relatively more producers than intermediaries. More specifically, a product on average seems to be imported by more additional private-owned producers (especially FORs) and private-owned trade agents (almost exclusively DPRIVs) and less by state-owned trade agents. These changes confirm the extension of trading rights to all firms, following China's accession to WTO, which allowed more easily both producers and final consumers located in China to access foreign varieties.
When distinguishing across product categories according to the end use, we can notice that the values documented above concern relatively more intermediate goods, as they represent the majority of product lines. 5 However, similar patterns are found for both final and capital goods, with slightly different magnitudes. Thus, more private-owned manufacturers located in China become able to access directly or indirectlythrough the increasing presence of private trade intermediariesa greater variety of both high-quality and low-quality foreign inputs following TPU reduction. This means that they can enjoy potential productivity gains and quality upgrading effects, implying an increase in consumers' welfare. At the same time, Chinese consumers also obtain a greater access to foreign final varieties of both high-quality and low-quality, implying additional potential welfare gains. Finally, it is worth noting that while the presence of state-owned intermediaries drastically fell in importing all product categoriesespecially, intermediate and capital goodsthe number of state-owned importing producers slightly decreased for only final goods, and even increased for capital goods. According these WTO commitments, China bound tariffs for all product lines, but the year of ultimate implementation can be different across products along ten-year period after becoming WTO member. This means that the applied tariff was still allowed to be higher than the final bound tariff until the last year of scheduled implementation. This would benefit relatively more the domestic downstream firms (and foreign upstream firms), as the number of foreign input varieties available will increase relatively more than the number of foreign competing final varieties. In other words, productivity gains from input varieties within downstream firms might be relatively larger than potential market shares losses arising from tougher foreign competition. 
Trade policy reforms

Empirical strategy
This section aims at exploring the product-level linkage between imports and trade policy uncertainty, by accounting also for changes in applied tariffs. Our baseline specification is given by:
where Mpt stands for the import outcome for product p and year t; Bindingpt-1 is a dummy variable taking value one if the product p is subject to the ultimate bound tariff in year t-1, and zero otherwise; Tariffpt-1 represents the simple average of applied MFN tariff rate of product line p in year t-1; is the classical error term. Notice that we also include both product and year fixed effects to control time-invariant product characteristics and common macroeconomic shocks across products. In subsequent specifications, we also include additional control variables, i.e. dummy variables that reflect the presence of non-tariff import barriers (NTBs) for each product p in a given
year t. 7 All standard errors are corrected for clustering at the product level. Notice that our explanatory variables are lagged by one year respect to the dependent variable as import reactions to trade policy changes may be not immediate. Moreover, potential reverse causality problems are reduced, although several works documented that trade policy reforms in China, especially during the WTO accession period, were unlikely to be endogenous, as China's willingness to become a market economy was going beyond the interests of specific groups (Branstetter and Lardy 2008). 8 Indeed, CTPR (2006) documents that China was able to implement all trade policy reforms, as scheduled by the WTO accession Protocol, including tariff binding.
7 NTB variables are: quotapt −1 is a dummy variable taking value one if the product p includes at least one 8-digit-HS product subject to the import quota in the year t−1; tenderingpt-1 is a dummy assuming value one if the product p includes at least one 8-digit-HS product subject to import tendering in the year t−1; and licensept-1 is a dummy variable taking value one if the product category p includes at least one 8-digit-HS product subject to the import license only in the year t−1. All NTB variables are based on the information from the WTO accession protocol of China. 8 Several empirical studies showed that changes in tariffs or non-tariff barriers were quite exogenous in China, i.e. unlikely to be influenced by sectors' performance or lobbying activities (Brandt, et al., 2017; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015; Imbruno, 2016) . 
Results
This section shows the results related to the specification (1), by analysing alternatively the country-related margins and the firm-related margins of imports (in Section 4.1, and 4.2, respectively). We first explore how home TPU influences the number of country-varieties available within each product line and/or the average imports per country-variety. Then, we also investigate whether domestic TPU also affects the number of importing firms within each product line and/or average imports per firm.
Country-analysis of product-level imports and trade policy uncertainty
Following the previous discussions on how foreign trade policy uncertainty affects export value and their margins, we expect that a reduction in Chinese trade policy uncertainty should allow
China to increase its imports, through an increase in both the number of imported varieties and the average imports per variety, due to the presence of sunk costs faced by foreign exporters (Handley, 2014; Handley and Limão, 2017) .
It is worth noting that in our context, a foreign variety refers to 6-digit product/origin country pair, as Handley (2014)'s approach. Consequently, when distinguishing the product-level import value in the number of imported varieties and the average imports per variety, we are essentially disentangling between the number of origin-countries (country-extensive margin) and the average imports per origin-country (country-intensive margin).
The first three columns of Table 3 show that tariff binding has a positive effect on product-level import value (by about 6.6%), through an increase in both country-intensive and country-extensive margins (by about 5.3% and 1.4%, respectively). Thus, domestic TPU reduction allows Chinese economy to access additional foreign varieties, as well as purchase more of each foreign variety.
The results on country-intensive margin are coherent with and complimentary to Handley and Limão (2017)'s findings, which document that product-level Chinese export value to US drastically increased following a reduction in US trade policy uncertainty. It is worth noting that, like in their evidence, we are not sure whether the domestic TPU reduction really implies the entry of new firmvarieties from a foreign country, as we cannot disentangle the number of firms exporting to China, and their average export sales. However, unlike Handley and Limão (2017) that focus on US's bilateral imports from China, we consider China's multilateral imports from all countries, therefore we are able to show further that a reduction in home TPU entails an increase in the number of source countries at the product-level, which reflects without any doubt the entry of new imported firm-varieties to the domestic market. Therefore, our results also confirm other studies' findings that focus more on the firm-extensive margin of exports, which document that a foreign TPU can delay firm's decision to export (Handley, 2014; Handley and Limão, 2015) . Applied tariff liberalization effect on import value and the related margins is also positive and statistically significant, coherently with our expectations. These results are robust when including non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) dummies as additional controls, as displayed in columns 4-6.
In the last two columns (7 and 8), we focus on the extensive margin by discriminating between OECD and non-OECD countries, to see whether TPU effect concerns relatively more suppliers from developed or developing economies. We expect that tariff binding has a larger effect for the former countries, as China was more likely to be involved in a tariff war with advanced economies (such as US and EU) rather than with developing countries. Indeed, our results show that while a reduction in applied tariff leads an increase in the number of country-varieties from both OECD and non-OECD areas, tariff binding allows the access to a greater number of OECD-varieties only.
To the extent that products from OECD are associated with higher quality, we can reach the conclusion that a reduction in home trade policy uncertainty leads China to access more varieties of high quality. These results are therefore coherent with and complementary to Feng, et al. In Previous literature well documented that the access to foreign intermediate inputs enhances firm productivity, through variety, quality and learning channels (Schor, 2004; Amiti and Konings, 2007, Goldberg, et al. 2010 ). More recent works highlighted that only a small number of firms are able to import intermediate inputs because of large sunk fixed costs of importing (Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Kasahara and Lapham, 2013) . Similar discussions are valid not only for producers Thus, this section aims at exploring whether tariff binding affects product-level import value, through the number of importing firms (firm-extensive margin) and the average imports per firm (firm-intensive margin). As regards the former margin, we also check whether there is any firm heterogeneity linked to the macro-sector status and the ownership status: i.e. whether tariff binding differently affects the number of importing producers and importing intermediaries, as well as the number of state-owned firms, foreign-owned firms and private-domestic-owned firms involved in import activities.
The columns 1-3 of Table 5 show that tariff binding positively affects product-level import value (by about 6.6%), through an increase in both firm-intensive and firm-extensive margins (by about 3.7% and 3.0%, respectively). Thus, Chinese TPU reduction allows more Chinese firms to enter the import markets, as well as more foreign purchases per (incumbent) importing firm. Similar effects are found from a reduction in applied tariffs, coherently with our expectations. These results are robust to the inclusion of NTB controls (columns 4-6).
When discriminating the extensive margin by considering the macro-sector of firms, i.e. between the number of importing producers and the number of importing intermediaries, we can see that both TPU reductions and applied tariff cuts generate positive effects for both firm groups. However, it is worth noting that while tariff liberalization benefits drastically more the entry of trade intermediaries to the import market than producers, tariff binding impact is slightly larger for the latter firms (2.8% versus 2.2%), suggesting that manufacturing firms have more incentive to start directly importing following TPU reduction. This is not surprising, as trade intermediaries are usually less-risk averse than producers, due to their greater diversification of the import markets across sectors and countries.
When exploring the ownership status in Table 6 , we can see that the positive binding effect is confirmed for both foreign-owned (with even larger magnitude) and state-owned producers, whereas the number of domestic-private importing producers appears to shrink following TPU reduction. In compensation, the latter would benefit relatively more from applied tariff reductions than the other producers. Therefore, it seems that foreign-owned manufacturing firms were relatively more risk-averse to start importing than domestic-private ones, and tariff binding would reallocate foreign goods from private-owned to foreign-owned producers. This might be a signal that a TPU reduction leads more foreign-owned producers located in China to serve the local market (importing more under ordinary regime), rather than simply assembling the final output for the global market (importing more under processing regime). As regards trade intermediaries, while tariff liberalization leads more non-foreign-owned intermediaries to enter the import markets (especially private ones), tariff binding allows more non-state-owned intermediaries to start importing (especially foreign ones). Thus, it seems that TPU reduction attracts more FDI in trade services sector.
When examining the end-use nature of goods ( Furthermore, intermediate goods seem to be imported by more producers (i.e. SOEs and FORs) and more intermediaries (i.e. SOEs and PRIVs), while final goods are imported by more trade agents (i.e. FORs) and less domestic producers (i.e. SOEs and PRIVs). These results further confirm that: a) more manufacturing firms are able to import directly or indirectly foreign intermediates, and therefore enjoy potential productivity gains; b) more foreign multinationals tend to be market-seeking rather than simply resource-seeking in China (considering the drastic increase in both inward FDI in manufacturing firms associated with importing intermediate inputs under ordinary regime, and inward FDI in distribution firms associated with importing final goods). Finally, the considerations made on imports of capital goods actually concern only domestic firms (i.e. domestic-private owned producers and state-owned trade agents), given that more foreign firms (both producers and trade agents) buy foreign capital goods following TPU reduction.
Conclusion
Trade policy uncertainty (TPU) plays an important role in firm's decisions to trade. Recent works have already stressed that firms face sunk fixed costs of exporting, and showed that reducing the fear that trade tariffs may suddenly increase without any limit, firms have more incentive to start exporting. Unlike the existing literature, we focus on import rather than export behaviour, considering that firms also need to pay sunk fixed costs of importing foreign goods, so that TPU reduction may affect firm's decisions to be involved in different stages of global value chains.
Analysing product-level Chinese import adjustments to tariff binding during the period 2000-2006, as scheduled by the China's WTO accession protocol (entered in force in December 2001), our baseline results show that Chinese economy can access more foreign varieties, especially from developed countries, which are typically associated with high-quality. We have also found that tariff binding leads foreign products to be imported by more Chinese firms, involved in either manufacturing production or trade intermediation services, extending potential gains from imports amongst more producers and final consumers located in China.
We have also documented heterogeneity across products associated with different end-use. Our findings suggest that tariff binding in China allows more manufacturing firms to access a greater variety of intermediate inputs, associated also with high-quality, which could partially explain
